Comments: Decriminalization of Non-Support in Maryland — a Re-Examination of a Uniform Act Whose Time Has Arrived by Ryan, William F., Jr.
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 7
Issue 1 Fall 1977 Article 5
1977
Comments: Decriminalization of Non-Support in
Maryland — a Re-Examination of a Uniform Act
Whose Time Has Arrived
William F. Ryan Jr.
University of Baltimore School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ryan, William F. Jr. (1977) "Comments: Decriminalization of Non-Support in Maryland — a Re-Examination of a Uniform Act
Whose Time Has Arrived," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol7/iss1/5
DECRIMINALIZATION OF NON-SUPPORT IN MARY-
LAND - A RE-EXAMINATION OF A UNIFORM ACT
WHOSE TIME HAS ARRIVED
After reviewing Maryland law providing criminal penalties
for the failure to support a spouse, child, or parent-in-need,
the author presents a better way to deal with non-support -
enactment of the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 14, 1977, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
removed one side of the criminal non-support triangle by its decision
in Coleman v. State of Maryland.' The court held unconstitutional
Article 27, section 88(a) of the Maryland Code which made it a crime
for a husband not to support his wife. 2 Child non-support 3 and non-
support of a parent-in-need, 4 the other sides of the triangle, remained
crimes under other sections of this somewhat outmoded statute.
Although the statute admittedly could be amended5 to conform
to article 46 of the Declaration of Rights (hereinafter the "Equal
Rights Amendment") by substituting "person" for "man," thereby
providing the required mutuality in spousal support, the Coleman
decision provides a timely opportunity to decriminalize non-support.
In recent years, almost perennial efforts to decriminalize non-
support have been introduced in the Maryland General Assembly.
6
These efforts have gained increasing support. In 1976, the Commit-
tee on Juvenile and Family Law and Procedure of the Maryland
Judicial Conference proposed decriminalization of non-support, and
the Committee's proposal was approved by the Maryland Judicial
Conference on April 24, 1976.7 In addition, decriminalization has
been supported by some members of the Council of the Juvenile and
Family Law Section of the Maryland State Bar Association. 8
The over-crowded criminal calendar alone provides sufficient
reason to decriminalize non-support. The burden which non-support
1. 37 Md. App. 322, 377 A.2d 553 (1977).
2. The basis for the court's holding was that article 46 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights, approved by the voters in 1972, provides that equality of rights under
the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex.
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 88(b) (Supp. 1977).
4. Id. art. 27, § 104 (1976).
5. See Law of April 29, 1977, ch. 213, 1977 Md. Laws 1852, by which the general
assembly repealed and reenacted article 27, § 88(a) to eliminate desertion of a
wife as a crime, but left non-support of a wife standing in spite of the Equal
Rights Amendment.
6. See H. 1532 (1977); S. 561 (1975); H. 774 (1974); H. 899 (1973); and H. 1235 (1972).
7. Transcript of Proceedings, 1976 Maryland Judicial Conference, April 24, 1976, p.
10.
8. Conversation with James G. Beach, Jr., Esq., Chairman of the MSBA Section of
Juvenile and Family Law, in Baltimore City (October 28, 1977).
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cases are currently placing on the criminal justice system is
illustrated by the fact that during Fiscal Year 1977, Maryland
criminal non-support cases totalled 2,284, equal to 5.29 percent of
criminal filings.9 The state public defender has noted that his office
handled approximately 2,000 criminal non-support cases during
Fiscal Year 1977 and that in Part 8 of the Criminal Court of
Baltimore three days a week are set aside for non-support cases.10
In addition to lessening this burden on the criminal calendar,
decriminalization would remove the criminal stigma now imposed
on persons found to owe a duty of support. 1' Judges seem reluctant
to impose imprisonment, the only realistic sanction the statute
provides, not only because imprisonment exacerbates underlying
conflicts within the family, but also because incarceration both
imperils employment and is counterproductive of support.
The purpose of this Comment is to re-examine one alternative to
criminal non-support available since 1954, when the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act 12 (hereinafter called "the
Uniform Act"). Endorsement by the American Bar Association
followed in the same year, and various versions have been enacted
in four states.' 3 The Uniform Act complements the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, adopted in Maryland in
1951.14
The principal operative sections of the Uniform Act are sections
2, 3, 6, 8 and 10. The remaining sections are definitional, or are
"boilerplate" provisions for jurisdiction and appeals, or are similar
to provisions found in other sections of the Maryland Code.'
5
The remainder of this Comment examines the operative sections
of the Uniform Act from the standpoint of Maryland statutory and
case law.
9. Statistical Abstract, Annual Report of the Maryland Judiciary, 1976-1977, Table
C-1, p. 34.
10. Conversation with Alan H. Murrell, Esq., State Public Defender, in Baltimore
City (October 21, 1977).
11. See Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288, 114 A.2d 66 (1955) (at common law, non-support
not a criminal offense).
12. 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 135 (1973).
13. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 241-254 (West) (Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19 §§ 441-453
(1964 & Supp. 1976-77); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546-A:1 to -A:12 (1974); UTAH
CODE ANN. §78-45-1 to -45-13 (Supp. 1975).
14. MD. ANN. CODE art. 89C (1969 & Supp. 1977).
15. For example, § 12 (Severability) of the Uniform Act is substantially the same as
MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, §23 (1976).
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II. UNIFORM ACT: SECTIONS 2 & 3 (MAN'S/WOMAN'S DUTY
OF SUPPORT)
The Uniform Act places spousal, child and parent-in-need
support on an equal footing in a simple format.
Section 2 of the Uniform Act reads as follows:
"§ 2. (Man's Duty of Support)
Every man shall support his wife, and his child [; and
his parent when in need]."
16
Section 3 of the Uniform Act reads as follows:
"§ 3. (Woman's Duty of Support)
Every woman shall support her child, and her husband
[and her parent] when in need."'17
Two states 8 have merged sections 2 and 3 in adopting the
Uniform Act. This is a precedent worth considering, in view of
Maryland's enactment of the Equal Rights Amendment.
An examination of whether the support provisions of the
Uniform Act are in accord with Maryland law follows: spousal
support is discussed in subsection A, child support in subsection B,
and support of a parent-in-need in subsection C.
A. Spousal Support
The duty of a husband to support his wife is well settled in
Maryland. At common law, a husband owes a legal duty to support
his wife. 19 This duty obligates a husband to furnish his wife with
necessaries, according to his means and station in life. 20 In addition
to the common law obligation, a husband is also under a statutory
obligation to provide support for his wife.21
Although there are no Maryland appellate decisions expressly
recognizing that a wife owes a corresponding duty of support to her
husband, recent statutory enactments have established a mutual
spousal obligation of support. The first step toward recognition of
this concept occurred with the 1972 passage of the Equal Rights
16. 9 UNIFORM LAwS ANN. 135, 136 (1973).
17. Id. at 138.
18. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546-A:2 (1974); CAL. CIV. CODE § 242 (Supp. 1977).
19. See Roberts v. Roberts, 160 Md. 513, 154 A. 95 (1931); Hood v. Hood, 138 Md. 355,
113 A. 895 (1921).
20. The Maryland Court of Appeals in Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288, 292, 114 A.2d 66,
69 (1955), equated the husband's obligation of support to the furnishing of
necessaries to the wife. If he did not, her remedy was to purchase the necessaries
on his credit.
21. MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 21 (1971).
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Amendment, which established that equality of rights under the law
shall not be abridged or denied because of sex.
Following enactment of the Equal Rights Amendment, an
alimony award to a wife was challenged by her husband in Minner
v. Minner22 on the ground that Article 16, Section 5(a) of the
Maryland Code violated the Equal Rights Amendment by providing
for an award of alimony to a wife without making any provision for
an award of alimony to a husband. Although the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals affirmed the alimony award to the wife, it stated
that in a proper case alimony could be awarded to a husband. In
Minner, however, the husband had not sought alimony.
The general assembly subsequently amended Article 16, Section
323 and Section 5(a), 24 establishing in 1975 a mutual spousal support
obligation in cases where a divorce is decreed, and extended this in
the following year to include alimony, alimony pendente lite and
counsel fees.
During the 1976 legislative session, the general assembly also
added Section 5B to Article 16 of the Maryland Code, 25 to provide
that a court may order a lien on the earnings of a party defaulting in
payment of court ordered spousal or child support. Use of the word
"spousal" further indicates the legislature's intent to place a wife's
obligation to support her husband on an equal footing with a
husband's duty to support his wife. For some reason, Article 45,
Section 21, which is the civil statutory basis for a husband's support
of his wife, remained untouched.
The concept of mutuality of support came to fruition on
September 14, 1977, when the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
decided Coleman. In that case, the court declared Article 27, Section
88(a) of the Maryland Code unconstitutional as violative of the
Equal Rights Amendment in that the statute made it a crime for a
husband to fail to support his wife, but did not make it a crime for a
wife to fail to support her husband.
Taken together, enactment of the Equal Rights Amendment in
1972, the amendments to Article 16 in 1975 and 1976, and the
Coleman decision establish that each spouse owes a duty to support
the other under Maryland law.
B. Child Support
Sections 2 and 3 of the Uniform Act impose upon both a man
and a woman the obligation to support their child. This duty is in
accord with Maryland law.
22. 19 Md. App. 154, 310 A.2d 208 (1973).
23. Law of April 22, 1975, ch. 332, 1975 Md. Laws 2119.
24. Law of May 4, 1976, ch. 440, 1976 Md. Laws 1161.
25. Law of May 4, 1976, ch. 496, 1976 Md. Laws 1311.
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Under the common law, a father has a legal obligation to
support his minor children. 26 There is also, in Maryland, CiVil 27 and
criminal 28 statutory liability for support of a minor child. The Parent
and Child Article29 provides that a father and mother are joint
natural guardians of their children under eighteen years of age and
are jointly and severally charged with their support. The paternity
statute provides that an order declaring a defendant to be the father
of a child shall also provide for the support and maintenance of the
child, and may also provide for contribution by the mother.3°
Although at common law there was no obligation on the part of
a parent to support an adult child,31 the criminal non-support statute
was amended in 1947 to establish the obligation of any person who
has an adult child unable to support himself by reason of mental or
physical infirmity to provide the child with necessary shelter, food,
care and clothing if the parent is possessed of, or is able to earn,
means sufficient to do so. 32 The paternity subtitle contains similar
provisions.33
Notwithstanding specific statutory language 34 jointly and
severally charging a father and mother with the support of a minor
child, until recently the Maryland courts followed the common law
rule announced by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Alvey v.
HartwigM that the father is primarily liable for the support of his
child. On June 30, 1977, in Rand v. Rand,36 the Maryland Court of
Appeals abrogated the common law rule and advanced the concept
of mutuality of spousal support by holding that the parental
obligation for child support is not primarily an obligation of the
father, but is one shared by both parents in accordance with their
respective financial resources. In placing child support on an equal
basis, the court stated that
The common law rule is a vestige of the past; it cannot be
reconciled with our commitment to equality of the sexes. Sex
of the parent in matters of child support cannot be a factor
26. See Blades v. Szatia, 151 Md. 644, 135 A. 841 (1927).
27. MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66H (1973 &
Supp. 1977).
28. Id. art. 27, § 88(b) (Supp. 1977).
29. Id. art. 72A, § 1 (Supp. 1977).
30. Id. art. 16, § 66H (a), (c) (1973 & Supp. 1977).
31. Borchert v. Borchert, 185 Md. 586, 590, 45 A.2d 463, 465 (1946).
32. Law of March 15, 1947, ch. 113, 1947 Md. Laws 164 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 97 (1976)). See Smith v. Smith, 227 Md. 355, 176 A.2d 862 (1962) (holding
that under this statute a father had an obligation to support his adult epileptic
son).
33. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66H(a)(1) (Supp. 1977).
34. Id. art. 72A, § 1 (Supp. 1977).
35. 106 Md. 254, 67 A. 132 (1907).
36. 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977); Rand was closely followed on July 28, 1977, by
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals decision in German v. German, 37 Md.
App. 120, 376 A.2d 115 (1977).
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in allocating this responsibility. Child support awards must
be made on a sexless basis.
37
Thus, Maryland law with respect to civil liability for child support
appears to be squarely in accord with the parental civil liability for
child support provisions of the Uniform Act.
In addition, Article 27, Section 88(b) imposes criminal penalties
for non-support of a child. Besides the strong policy arguments for
de-criminalizing non-support, another, and possibly compelling,
reason suggests that repeal of this statute may be prudent. In
Williams v. Williams 38 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held
that the Parent and Child Article39 applies only to children born in
wedlock, and that the paternity subtitle40 is the exclusive basis for
enforcing the support obligation of the parents of a child born out of
wedlock. From this it seems clear that the object of Article 27,
Section 88(b) is to provide directly for unsupported legitimate
children. 41 The former statute, making bastardy a criminal offense,
42
also contained provisions for the support and education of illegiti-
mate children. The failure of the general assembly to repeal Article
27, Section 88(b) in 1963 when it repealed the Bastardy and
Fornication Article may, curiously, have violated the equal protec-
tion clause 43 of the fourteenth amendment by leaving standing
criminal sanctions for non-support of children on the basis of
legitimacy. As a result, despite the fact that parents of legitimate
and illegitimate children have identical duties of support toward
their children, 44 only parents of legitimate children appear to be
subject to criminal liability for non-support.
In determining the validity of state statutes under the equal
protection clause, the statutory classification must, at a minimum,
bear some rational and reasonable relationship to a legitimate state
purpose.45 While it may be reasonable to subject all parents who fail
to support their children to criminal liability, it is questionable
whether it is rational to subject only the class of parents of
legitimate children to criminal liability when parents of both
37. 280 Md. 508, 516, 374 A.2d 900, 905 (1977).
38. 18 Md. App. 353, 306 A.2d 564 (1973).
39. MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A (Supp. 1977).
40. Id. art. 16, § 66A-P (1973 & Supp. 1977).
41. See State v. James, 203 Md. 113, 100 A.2d 12 (1953).
42. MD. ANN. CODE art. 12, Bastardy and Fornication, repealed by Law of April 30,
1963, ch. 722, 1963 Md. Laws 1497, which also enacted MD. ANN. CODE art. 16,
§ 66A-P. See Corley v. Moore, 236 Md. 241, 203 A.2d 697 (1964).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
44. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66A (1973) assigns to parents of illegitimate children
the same support responsibilities as are assigned to parents of legitimate
children by MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (Supp. 1977).
45. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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legitimate and illegitimate have identical support responsibilities. 46
Repeal of the criminal non-support statute and enactment of the
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act would restore the former
equality in application of the non-support law as between parents of
legitimate and illegitimate children, on the basis of purely civil
liability.
C. Support of Parents-In-Need
Sections 2 and 3 of the Uniform Act provide (in brackets) for the
support of parents-in-need. This also is in accord with Maryland law,
which since 1916 has recognized a legal obligation to support a
parent who is destitute and unable to support himself or herself
because of old age, infirmity, or illness.47 The Maryland statute
imposes criminal penalties on any person possessed of means to do
so who fails to support a destitute parent. Repeal of this statute and
reenactment in the form of the Uniform Act would continue this
liability on a civil basis, and undoubtedly would result in more
frequent enforcement of this seldom invoked obligation.
III. UNIFORM ACT: SECTION 6 (AMOUNT OF SUPPORT)
Section 6 of the Uniform Act reads as follows:
§ 6. (Amount of Support)
When determining the amount due for support the court
shall consider all relevant factors including but not limited
to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the
parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the need of the obligee;
(f) the age of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support
of others. 48
The section seems largely declaratory of Maryland law as
recently expressed in Rand, and particularly in German v. German,
in which the Maryland Court of Special Appeals enumerated the
46. In this regard it is significant to note that during 1975, 47.2% of the live births in
Baltimore City were illegitimate. See VITAL STATISTICS 1975, BALTIMORE,
MARYLAND 11 (December, 1976, Baltimore City Health Department, Bureau of
Biostatistics).
47. Law of April 18, 1916, ch. 637, 1916 Md. Laws 1320 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 104 (1976)).
48. 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 135, 140 (1973).
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factors to be considered in determining the amount of support
payments, stating:
The factors which the chancellor should consider include the
financial circumstances of the parties, their age and
physical condition, their ability to work, the family's station
in life, and the expense of educating the children. The
supporting parents' financial ability and the needs of the
children are the controlling factors.
49
The factors set forth in Section 6 of the Uniform Act appear to be
entirely consistent with those currently considered in Maryland.
IV. UNIFORM ACT: SECTION 8 (ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS)
Section 8 of the Uniform Act reads as follows:
The obligee may enforce his right of support against the
obligor and the state [or any political subdivision thereof]
may proceed on behalf of the obligee to enforce his right of
support against the obligor. Whenever the state [or a
political subdivision thereof] furnishes support to an obligee,
it has the same right as the obligee to whom the support was
furnished, for the purpose of securing reimbursement and of
obtaining continuing support.
50
These provisions appear to be wholly consistent with Maryland
law, as embodied in the Child Support Enforcement subtitle of the
Social Services Administration Article5' and the Support of Depend-
ents Article.
52
Enactment of the Uniform Act would, it is submitted, have no
practical effect on the collection of support money as, in the final
analysis, the same sanction would apply in the enforcement of a
civil support order in equity as now applies in enforcement of a
criminal order for support. Decriminalizing non-support, however,
would obviate the necessity of procuring renewal of a criminal order
for support every three years, as a comparable civil support order in
equity not only provides the same sanction after the fact, but also
continues.
49. 37 Md. App. 120, 121-22, 376 A.2d 115, 117 (1977).
50. 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 135, 141 (1973).
51. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 59 (Supp. 1977).
52. Id. art. 89C (1969 & Supp. 1977).
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V. UNIFORM ACT: SECTION 10 (EVIDENCE OF HUSBAND
AND WIFE)
Section 10 of the Uniform Act reads as follows:
§ 10. (Evidence of Husband and Wife)
Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure of
communications between husband and wife are inapplicable
under this act. Husband and wife are competent witnesses to
testify to any relevant matter, including marriage and
parentage.
53
This section is substantially similar to Section 21 of the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act5 4 adopted in Maryland in
1951, and thus appears to be consistent with Maryland law.
Although Section 9-105 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article of the Code renders a spouse incompetent to disclose "any
confidential communication between the spouses occurring during
their marriage", the fact of spousal non-support is no more a
"confidential communication" than is, for example, assault and
battery; and both are frequently alleged in bills for divorce or
alimony. In Raymond v. State ex rel. Younkins, 55 a criminal case
involving assault and battery by a husband on his wife, the court
held that the predecessor statute did not apply, and that the wife
was competent to testify to the offense committed against her by her
husband. Moreover, in the recent case of Harris v. State,5 6 the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals held, in considering on appeal
whether the trial judge erred in admitting into evidence alleged
confidential communications between the appellant and his wife,
that the spouse/incompetency rule57 was inapplicable when the
confidential communication constitutes a threat or crime against the
other spouse, and that in those situations the statute itself is
rendered inapplicable.
53. 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 135, 142 (1973).
54. MD. ANN. CODE art. 89C, § 21 (1969 & Supp. 1977).
55. 195 Md. 126, 72 A.2d 711 (1950).
56. 37 Md. App. 180, 376 A.2d 1144 (1977).
57. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-105 (1974).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Re-examination of the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act
indicates that its terms are fully consistent with Maryland law, and
that it provides a simple vehicle for effectuating modern and
comprehensive civil liability for support of spouses, children and
parents-in-need, readily available for adaptation in the event the
general assembly should conclude that the time has come to
decriminalize non-support.
William F. Ryan, Jr.
